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Abstract:
Non-cognitivists claim that thick concepts can be disentangled into distinct
descriptive and evaluative components and that since thick concepts have de-
scriptive shape they can be mastered independently of evaluation. In
Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, John McDowell uses Wittgenstein’s
rule-following considerations to show that such a non-cognitivist view is un-
tenable. In this paper I do several things. I describe the non-cognitivist posi-
tion in its various forms and explain its driving motivations. I then explain
McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism and the Wittgensteinian con-
siderations upon which it relies, because this has been sufficiently misunder-
stood by critics and rarely articulated by commentators. After clarifying
McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism, I extend the analysis to show
that commentators of McDowell have failed to appreciate his argument and
that critical responses have been weak. I argue against three challenges posed
to McDowell, and show that the case of thick concepts should lead us to re-
ject non-cognitivism.
1. Cognitivist and Non-Cognitivist Claims
Cognitivists claim that moral statements express beliefs that are truth-evaluable.
Cognitivists are normally moral realists, but they needn’t be. For instance, the error
theorist John Mackie (1977) claims that, although moral statements express
truth-evaluable beliefs, moral statements are all systematically false because the world
as it genuinely is does not contain moral features. So Mackie is a cognitivist yet a
moral anti-realist. However, cognitivism is most attractive to moral realists who claim
that moral statements express truth-evaluable beliefs and that at least some of these be-
liefs are true by virtue of representing moral features that genuinely obtain in the
world. In contrast, non-cognitivists claim that there are no moral features that are gen-
uine. Further, they claim that moral statements do not express truth-evaluable beliefs,
but rather work primarily to express something non-cognitive, such as attitudes of ap-
proval or disapproval, or desire.
1 This paper was awarded the University of Pennsylvania’s Elizabeth F. Flower Prize for best philosophi-
cal paper of the year (2009-2010). Special thanks go out to Elisabeth Camp for helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this paper.
2. Non-Cognitivist Accounts and Thick Concepts
Let’s review some non-cognitivist accounts of moral statements, starting with A.J.
Ayer’s emotivism. Emotivism holds that ‘in so far as statements of value… are not sci-
entific, they are not in the literal sense significant, but are simply expressions of emo-
tion which can be neither true or false’ (Ayer 1952: 102-103). Since Ayer believes that
only naturalistic scientific statements represent the world as it genuinely is, and since
moral statements are not naturalistic scientific statements, Ayer concludes that moral
statements are not ‘significant propositions’ suitable for truth-value. However, as Ayer
himself understood, this entails that genuine disagreement on moral issues is impossi-
ble. If moral concepts are only ‘pseudo-concepts’ as the emotivist claims, then the
propositions in which they occur are not genuine propositions at all. And if moral
statements are not genuine propositions but mere emotive ejaculations, moral state-
ments are not truth-evaluable, and resultantly, unsuitable for genuine agreement or dis-
agreement (Ayer 1952: 107-108).
Most non-cognitivists have been unwilling to accept that disagreement over moral
statements is impossible. Indeed, accounting for moral disagreement is one thing we
expect from a successful account of moral statements (Stevenson 1937: 16).
Resultantly, one classical non-cognitivist move has been to suggest that the content of
a moral concept is not exclusively emotive or evaluative; moral concepts also contain
sufficient descriptive content such that we can genuinely disagree over the proposi-
tions in which they occur. R.M. Hare, for instance, suggests that the term ‘good’ is
composed of both an evaluative and descriptive meaning (1970: 118-119). Hare fur-
ther claims that:
although with ‘good’ the evaluative meaning is primary, there are other words
in which the evaluative meaning is secondary to the descriptive. Such words
are [e.g.] ‘tidy’ and ‘industrious’ (1970: 121).
The concepts ‘tidy’ and ‘industrious’, which Hare points out, are called ‘thick con-
cepts’. Thick concepts are characterized as ‘hold[ing] together a property and an atti-
tude… or, as it is also sometimes put, description and evaluation’ (Dancy 1996: 263).
Typical examples include: ‘shameful’, ‘lewd’ (Gibbard 1992: 278-279), ‘treacherous’,
‘rude’, ‘cruel’, ‘honest’ (Blomberg 2007: 63), ‘courage’, ‘delicate’ and aesthetic con-
cepts (Burton 1992: 28-29) and concepts of moral virtues (McDowell 1981: 144) and
vices (Dancy 1996: 263). The thick moral concept ‘courageous’, for instance, is typi-
cally conceived as including both description and evaluation. ‘Courageous’ is descrip-
tive in that it’s normally applied to the same types of descriptive items, e.g. to acts of
strength and determination in the face of conflict,2 and it’s by virtue of this descriptive
component that thick moral concepts are considered genuine concepts. Yet ‘coura-
geous’ is evaluative in that it’s normally indicative of an evaluative pro-attitude, and
it’s by virtue of this evaluative component that thick moral concepts are considered
moral concepts. That is, if thick moral concepts lacked description then according to
the non-cognitivist we could not genuinely disagree over the moral statements in
which they occur, and if thick moral concepts lacked evaluation there would be no
S. Afr. J. Philos. 2010, 29(3) 287
2 What’s important here is the point that ‘courageous’ is descriptive in that it normally applies to the same
types of descriptive items; the particular descriptive example I chose – e.g. strength and determination
in the face of conflict – is inessential to my general point and it may be substituted for another descrip-
tion that the reader finds more apt. But the point here remains that ‘courageous’ is descriptive in that it
normally applies to those same types of descriptive items.
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moral statements over which to disagree. So the thick moral concept ‘courageous’ pre-
sumably involves both description and evaluation, e.g., a pro-attitude towards acts of
strength and determination in the face of conflict.
3. Non-Cognitivist Motivations
We saw that Ayer’s early non-cognitivism was motivated by a naturalistic conception
of what counts as a ‘significant proposition’. Since Ayer believed that moral state-
ments are not naturalistic scientific statements and that only the latter genuinely repre-
sent the world, Ayer concluded that moral statements are not significant truth-apt
propositions. It’s because Ayer assumes that there are no moral features in the world
that he denies that moral statements are propositions representing how the world is.
It’s unsurprising, then, that non-cognitivism is typically motivated by a naturalism
that takes for granted what Bernard Williams calls the ‘absolute conception’ of the
world. As Williams explains, this is a conception of the world ‘consisting of
nonperspectival materials available to any adequate investigator, of whatever constitu-
tion’ (1985: 139-140) which serves to distinguish ‘the world as it is independent of
our experience’ from ‘the world as it seems to us’ (1985: 139-140). The appeal of the
absolute conception is presumably due to its promise to explain ‘how the more local
representations of the world [as it appears to us] can come about’ and how ‘to relate
them to each other, and to the world as it is independently of them’ (Williams 1978:
245-246).
In order to articulate ‘the world as it is independent of our experience’ in a way that
is distinct from our articulation of ‘the world as it seems to us’, we’ll need to utilize
two distinct types of concepts. ‘Response-dependent concepts’, as Mark Johnston de-
fines them, are ‘those concepts which exhibit a conceptual dependence or interdepen-
dence with concepts of our responses’ (1989: 145). As concepts that are conceptually
interdependent with concepts of our responses, response-dependent concepts are those
suitable to articulate the features of ‘the world as it seems to us’, e.g. concepts of color
and other secondary-quality features, evaluative features, etc. (Johnston 1989: 146). In
contrast, ‘response-independent concepts’ are those that are not dependent or interde-
pendent in this way (Johnston 1989: 146). As concepts that are conceptually independ-
ent of concepts of our responses, response-independent concepts are those suitable to
articulate features of ‘the world as it is independent of our experience’, e.g. concepts
of science, mathematics, etc. Indeed, it seems that the best ‘place to begin… explicat-
ing the primary/secondary quality distinction is with the response-independent, re-
sponse-dependent distinction’ (Johnston 1989: 147).
Now, someone accepting the absolute conception of the world, as McDowell points
out, may come to distrust the genuineness of secondary-quality features. Assuming
that genuine features must be represented in concepts of naturalistic primary-qualities,
and that our experiences of secondary-qualities represent the world as containing fea-
tures other than those of primary-quality and so must be further explained down into
primary-quality concepts, one might resultantly believe that an experience of second-
ary-quality ‘fails to be a transparent mode of access to something that is [genuinely]
there [in the world] anyway’, independent of us (McDowell 1981: 142). This in turn
suggests that by maximally purifying from our conception of the world those second-
ary-quality features the concepts of which are response-dependent, our inquiries
should ideally ‘converge on an answer, where the best explanation of the convergence
involves the idea that the answer represents how things [genuinely] are’ (McDowell
1981: 136).
However, it’s implausible that the convergence of judgments found in the area of
moral discourse will replicate that of the natural sciences (Williams 1985: 136). One
might be inclined to reject moral features as genuine as one had rejected second-
ary-quality features. For instance, secondary-quality features such as color are depend-
ent upon our subjective constitution in that an investigator of very different constitu-
tion may un-illusorily encounter a world completely lacking in color features. And as
concepts of color are interdependent with concepts of our responses, so in a similar
way concepts of morality are interdependent with concepts of our responses insofar as
they concern how we ought to respond with our actions. Moreover, as McDowell ar-
gues, moral features can be seen as dependent upon us because it’s by virtue of ‘our
affective and attitudinative propensities… that we can be brought to care in appropri-
ate ways about the things we learn to see as collected together by the classifications’
of ‘courageous’, etc. (1981: 142). So one might argue that since our best naturalistic
conception of the world is seen as a result of purifying secondary-quality features from
it, on similar grounds we must reject moral features. On this view, moral features have
no place in our account of the world as it genuinely or objectively is (McDowell 1981:
154).
The absolute conception is considered an ‘objective’ account of the world precisely
because it factors out features the concepts of which are response-dependent, leaving
in its account only those features that are considered fundamentally primary by virtue
of describing the world as it is independently of us. On this view, only those features
that can be described in response-independent concepts will be considered genuine,
because those are the only features that are represented as obtaining in the world as it
is anyway, independently of us. This view further suggests that features that are de-
scribed in response-dependent concepts are not genuine, since these features aren’t
represented as obtaining in the world as it is anyway. Resultantly, the absolute concep-
tion in its purest form denies the genuineness of secondary-quality and evaluative fea-
tures. Accordingly, if beliefs are to track genuine features, they are to track those fea-
tures articulated in descriptive naturalistic concepts, not moral or evaluative ones. And
it is precisely the acceptance of such a view that leads non-cognitivists to assume that
there are no moral features in the world for beliefs to truth-aptly track.
4. Rejecting the Disentangling Manoeuvre
As McDowell explains, non-cognitivism holds that:
when we ascribe value to something, what is actually happening can be disen-
tangled into two components. Competence with an evaluative concept involves,
first, a sensitivity to an aspect of the world as it really is… and second, a pro-
pensity to a certain [non-cognitive] attitude… from which items in the world
seem to be endowed with the value in question… [so] in making value judg-
ments, [an agent] register[s] the presence in objects of some property they au-
thentically have, but enrich their conception of this property with the reflection
of an attitude (1981: 143-144).
The non-cognitivist Alan Gibbard provides an example of how an ‘evaluative concept’
might be applied, which will be helpful here. Gibbard, in describing how a foreign
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tribe – the Kumi – apply their thick moral concept ‘gopa’, explains their application
procedure as consisting of two stages:
[first] they observe an act they know to be the killing of an outgroup member in
the face of danger. They conclude ‘This act is gopa’. Then they further con-
clude, ‘Let us glory in this act!’ (1992: 268).
According to Gibbard, the Kumi first cognitively track descriptive features (the killing
of an out-group member in the face of danger) and then respond to these features with
an evaluation (a positive evaluation such as ‘how glorious!’). As this view suggests,
the descriptive content of the Kumi’s cognition is distinct from their evaluative non-
cognitive pro-attitude since the latter is only a response to the former.
Non-cognitivists claim that it’s the descriptive content of the thick concept that de-
termines its correct application, because it’s by virtue of its description alone that the
concept is applied to the same type of descriptive things. In other words,
non-cognitivists claim that the concept has descriptive shape; the concept is shaped by
description. Non-cognitivists further claim that the evaluative component is distinct
from the descriptive and so does not determine the concept’s shape (Williams 1985:
141). They deny that evaluation is itself ‘in some way percipient’ or capable of ‘ex-
panding our sensitivity to how things are’ (McDowell 1981: 143). Rather, non-cogni-
tivists think that the evaluation piggybacks on the description to express our non-cog-
nitive attitude towards the action we are applying the thick concept to.
Now, McDowell denies that thick concepts can be disentangled into distinct descrip-
tive and evaluative components. Here’s his central argument against the ‘disentangling
manoeuvre’:
If the disentangling manoeuvre is always possible, that implies that the exten-
sion of the associated [thick] term [e.g. ‘courage’]… could be mastered inde-
pendently of the special concerns which, in the [moral] community, would
show themselves in admiration or emulation of actions seen as falling under the
[thick] concept [of courage]. That is: one could know which actions the [thick]
term [‘courage’] would be applied to… without even embarking on an attempt
to make sense of their admiration. That [attempt to make sense of their admira-
tion] would be an attempt to comprehend their perspective [from inside the
moral community]; whereas, according to the [non-cognitivist] position I am
considering, the genuine feature to which the [thick] term is applied should be
graspable without benefit of understanding the special perspective [from inside.
That is, it should be graspable from the outside, independent of the moral com-
munity’s special perspective] (McDowell 1981: 144).
McDowell denies the non-cognitivist claim that thick concepts can be disentangled
into distinct descriptive and evaluative components because this ‘disentangling ma-
noeuvre’ would require that one could master the extension of the thick concept inde-
pendently of understanding why we evaluate the items falling under its extension as
we do. That is, in order to master the thick concept ‘courageous’, the non-cognitivist
claims that we needn’t understand the practice of moral evaluation at all. Rather, they
claim that it’s sufficient to cognitively track purely descriptive features, e.g. strength
and determination in the face of conflict. Presumably, evaluations are simply post-cog-
nitive responses and don’t contribute to the shape of the thick concept, and so aren’t
required for one to have mastery over its extension.
But McDowell argues that this non-cognitivist view is mistaken. In order to under-
stand a thick concept such as ‘courageous’ and gain mastery over its extension, one
must be able to understand why certain actions, and not others, are considered the ones
apt for falling under the extension of that thick concept. In other words, mastery over
the extension of a thick concept requires evaluating candidates for its extension and
determining which ones are apt. For instance, not just any act of strength and determi-
nation in the face of conflict will count as courageous. One might face the conflict of
trying to read peacefully in a room of crying babies (e.g. at a hospital) and so evince
the determination to strongly slap each baby to shut them up. But there’s nothing cou-
rageous about that. Or consider a racist that evinces strength and determination in der-
ogating racial groups that he despises. That needn’t be ‘courageous’ either. Clearly,
then, only certain acts of strength and determination in the face of conflict are aptly
‘courageous’, and it’s an evaluative outlook that reveals that the baby-slapper and rac-
ist’s actions, although satisfying the description, are not apt for the concept ‘coura-
geous’.3
Moreover, it’s no use for the non-cognitivist to suggest that we should include into
the meaning of ‘courageous’ e.g. an appropriate amount of un-foolishness, un-deroga-
toriness etc. because to do this is simply to pack an evaluative requirement into the
very definition of ‘courageous’. That is, an evaluative outlook is still required in order
to determine what e.g. counts as an ‘appropriate amount’ of un-foolishness for an act
to still count as a ‘courageous’ one. To suggest that we pack an evaluative requirement
into the definition of a thick concept would be to allow evaluation to shape the thick
concept, and this is something the non-cognitivist is strictly committed against. So
such a suggestion remains unavailable to the non-cognitivist.
Clearly only certain descriptive features are apt for thick concepts such as ‘coura-
geous’, and an understanding of why certain acts and not others are apt involves more
than simply tracking some pre-evaluative set of descriptive features. In order to prop-
erly evaluate actions e.g. as courageous requires the development of a certain sort of
sensitivity and sensibility: to share in a perspective that views actions as pro or con, as
worthy of praise or worthy of contempt. Through our development and enculturation
into a social practice of evaluating actions and appreciating certain features in those
actions as salient, we learn to collect certain actions, but not others, together under the
extension of particular moral concepts. As one grows into the moral community and
acquires a morally sensitive outlook, one learns how to pick out which features aptly
belong under the extension of a thick moral concept, and how to respond to the actions
grouped together by this concept in certain ways. Mastery over moral concepts re-
quires more than cognitively picking out natural descriptive features in the world, it
requires a moral upbringing, moral eyes, and a moral point or purpose, and so a ‘per-
son from another culture who failed to see the evaluative point of a thick [moral] con-
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3 Consider also the thick aesthetic concept ‘delicate’. Non-cognitivists typically assume that in order to
master this aesthetic concept it is sufficient that one cognitively track purely descriptive features, e.g.
objects with the descriptive properties of being small, pale, and fragile. But as Stephan Burton has
rightly argued, “not just any small size, pale colors, and fragility will do the trick. Only some small,
pale, fragile things are delicate; the vast majority are merely bland” (1992: 30). In other words, whereas
it’s typically apt to ascribe the aesthetic concept ‘delicate’ to flowers or to a young female lover, it
would typically be considered inapt to ascribe that same term to, for instance, a small piece of rotting
flesh that was nonetheless small, pale, and fragile. Thus, only certain small, pale, and fragile objects are
aptly ‘delicate’, and it’s from within an evaluative framework that one comes to understand that the
small, pale, and fragile piece of rotting flesh is not apt for the concept ‘delicate’.
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cept would not be able to predict local use of it on the basis of descriptive similarities
alone’ (Dancy 1996: 263).
To recap: the non-cognitivist claimed that thick concepts contain distinct descriptive
and evaluative components that can in principle be disentangled, and that since the lat-
ter component is simply a response to the former one, the extension of a thick moral
concept can in principle be mastered by someone outside the viewpoint of the commu-
nity of moral evaluators. Yet contrary to this claim, we saw that for thick concepts,
evaluation partly determines description since we must rely on an evaluative outlook
in order to pick out those features that aptly belong under the extension of the thick
concept. For instance, only certain acts of strength and determination in the face of
conflict are aptly ‘courageous’, and how these ‘certain’ acts are to be picked out is by
reference to the outlook of the community of moral evaluators. Resultantly, one cannot
master the extension of a thick concept independently of evaluation. And since the ex-
tension of thick moral concepts is determined by both description and evaluation,
McDowell argues that the non-cognitivist is wrong to suppose that ‘corresponding to
any value concept, one can always isolate a genuine feature of the world… a feature
that is there anyway, independently of anyone’s value experience being as it is – to be
that which competent users of the concept are to be regarded as responding when they
use it’ (1981: 144). Description, considered by the non-cognitivist as something dis-
tinct and separable from evaluation, is insufficient for those outside the community of
moral evaluators to master the extension of thick moral concepts because thick con-
cepts have both descriptive and evaluative shape. Therefore, contra non-cognitivism,
evaluation is not something that can simply be ‘disentangled’ away from the thick
concept.
5. The Objective Conception of Rules: Psychologically Grasping
Independently Fixed Rules
It’s commonly understood that in order to correctly apply a concept, moral or other-
wise, to the same types of things, one must use the concept in accord with the rule for
its application: for ‘judgments or utterances to be intelligible as applications of a sin-
gle concept to different objects, [they] must belong to a practice of going on doing the
same thing’ (McDowell 1981: 145). This ‘going on to do the same thing’ is typically
conceived by the non-cognitivist as fixed by rules that determines a concept’s correct
application. Such rules are fixed ‘independently of the responses and reactions a pro-
pensity to which one acquires when one learns the practice [involving the rule] itself’
(McDowell 1981: 146) because, presumably, if rules were not independent of human
responses then we would be unable to account for the normativity of rules, i.e. that
one’s responses can be wrong. By accounting for the fixedness or objectivity of rules
on the grounds that rules are independent of human responses, the non-cognitivist as-
sumes that rules can only be objectively fixed within the objective account of the
world offered by the absolute conception. Accounting for the fixedness of rules out-
side of the absolute conception’s framework strikes the non-cognitivist as simply im-
plausible. As Gibbard says:
I think I get the idea of a non-objectivist model, where we see… judgments as a
cultural artifact. But where in this model is there room for truth and falsehood?
There is only a way of living (1992: 269).
However, an account of the fixedness of rules does not yet give us an account of how
we grasp and act in accord with rules. So corresponding to their account of the fixed-
ness of rules, non-cognitivists must further provide an account of how we grasp and
act in accord with these rules. Unsurprisingly, the non-cognitivist explains our ability
to grasp and act in accord with rules by positing some ‘special psychic mechanism that
ties discussion to action’ (Gibbard 1992: 278). Presumably, it’s because we possess
the appropriate psychological machinery that we can grasp rules and act in accord with
them. So the non-cognitivist offers a two-component account of rule-following involv-
ing (1) that there are rules fixed independently of human responses, and (2) that hu-
mans possess psychological machinery by which we can grasp these independently
fixed rules and act in accord with them. If the non-cognitivist lacks (1), then there are
no rules for humans to psychologically grasp and act in accord with. If the
non-cognitivist lacks (2), then there are no means for human to grasp rules and act in
accord with them.
So the non-cognitivist account of rule-following is successful just in case (1) and (2)
are both accounted for. McDowell’s strategy against the non-cognitivist account of
rule-following then, is to use Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to discredit
(2), thereby rendering (1) suspect. McDowell clearly suggests that this is his strategy:
the idea that the rules of a practice mark out rails traceable independently of the
reactions of participants is suspect… and insistence that wherever there is go-
ing on in the same way there must be rules that can be conceived as marking
out such independently traceable rails involves a misconception… We can be-
gin working up to this conclusion by coming to appreciate the emptiness… of
the psychological component of the picture: that is, the idea that grasp of a rule
is a matter of having one’s mental wheels engaged with an independently trace-
able rail (1981: 146).
McDowell later continues:
The [non-cognitivist] picture [we are considering here] has two interlocking
components: the idea of the psychological mechanism correlates with the idea
that the tracks we follow are objectively there to be followed, in a way that
transcends the reactions and responses of participants in our practices. If the
first component is suspect, the second component should be suspect to. And it
is (1981: 150).
Unfortunately, other commentators attempting to analyze McDowell’s Wittgensteinian
argument against non-cognitivism have typically failed to properly discuss the crucial
role that (2) plays, and as a result, fail to present McDowell’s argument thoroughly
and adequately. Gerald Lang, for instance, only discusses (2) in passing (2001: 191)
and Olle Blomberg (2007) doesn’t discuss (2) at all. I think that Lang and Blomberg
pose unconvincing arguments against McDowell because they fail to appreciate (and
adequately articulate) this aspect of McDowell’s Wittgensteinian argument. In this
section I’ll discuss the crucial argument against (2), which is a neglected yet central
aspect of McDowell’s argument. In §7 I’ll explain how the rule-following consider-
ations cause problems for non-cognitivist accounts of thick concepts in general, and in
§8 and §10 I’ll return to offer particular arguments against Lang and Blomberg, re-
spectively.
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One might conceive of an initial argument against the non-cognitivist’s (2) along the
following lines. Imagine that a child, Jones, has correctly solved a finite set of addition
problems involving numbers < 57. After sampling Jones’s finite success with such
problems, we claim that ‘Jones understands the plus rule’. To account for the ‘continu-
ity’ of Jones’s behavior in these cases, we posit the rule ‘plus’ as one that is fixed in-
dependently of the responses of Jones and other problem solvers (Wittgenstein 1953:
§218) and we posit a psychological mechanism in Jones by virtue of which this rule is
grasped (Wittgenstein 1953: §146). But, as this argument might go, how does positing
a psychic grasp of the ‘plus’ rule account for the ‘continuity’ of Jones’s behavior? For
consider also the following rules:
(i) quus: denoted by ‘!’ where x ! y = x + y, if x, y < 57, but = 5 otherwise
(Kripke 1982: 9)
(ii) guus: denoted by ‘!1’ where x !1 y = x + y, if x, y < 57, but = 6 otherwise
(iii) buus: denoted by ‘!2’ where x !2 y = x + y, if x, y < 57, but = 7 otherwise
(iiii) tuus: denoted by ‘!3’ where x !3 y = x + y, if x, y < 57, but = 8 otherwise
Since, by hypothesis, Jones has so far only solved problems involving numbers < 57,
one might just as legitimately posit Jones as grasping any one of these other rules, or
infinitely many others, to ‘explain’ his finite behavior. Yet if any of an infinite number
of rules can be used to explain his finite behavior, then it becomes implausible that his
behavior is satisfyingly explained by positing his psychic grasp of the plus rule in par-
ticular. That is, positing such a mediating mental state based on Jones’s previous be-
havior gets us no further in understanding how Jones’s behavior will continue. Or,
imagine that in a new case Jones is given a problem involving numbers > 57, e.g. ‘67
+ 92’. He answers ‘7’, and insists that this is how the rule he had learned was to conti-
nue (e.g. he says confidently, ‘I know it! Seriously, the rule continues like this…’). Al-
though Jones’s response here strikes us as odd, his response is still compatible with the
examples from which he learned to solve problems, which all involved numbers < 57.
Again, this shows ‘that his behavior hitherto was not guided by the psychological con-
formation we were picturing as guiding it’ and that ‘the pictured state, then, always
transcends any grounds there may be for postulating it’ (McDowell 1981: 147). As a
result, the ‘postulation of the mediating state is an idle intervening step; it does noth-
ing to underwrite the confidence of our expectation [of an agent’s behavior]’
(McDowell 1981: 148). So the positing of such a psychic ‘grasp’ does nothing to
ground the continuity of Jones’s (or any agent’s) behavior.4
However, the problem with the non-cognitivist account of rule-following is not just
that some finite behavior can be interpreted by infinitely many rules, although one
might see that as a problem (Kripke 1982: 8-27). For if that’s all the problem consists
in then the non-cognitivist can still claim that there really are infinitely many inde-
pendently fixed rules out in reality, and all that needs to be provided is a convincing
story for how one psychically grasps the right rule. That is, the non-cognitivist might
still think of ‘grasping a rule’ as coming to possess the right mediating mental state –
the mental state the wheels of which engage with the right independently traceable
4 In his work Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language (1982) Saul Kripke concedes the skeptical
point that there are thus no facts that we can follow in accord with a rule; however, Kripke attempts to
explain that there are still conditions under which we are warranted in asserting of others that they are
following a rule. For reasons why Kripke’s solution to the so-called ‘rule following paradox’ fails, see
my paperWittgenstein, Kripke, and the Rule Following Paradox (2010).
rule-road – and so think that it’s the possession of a mediating mental state that’s es-
sential to grasping a rule.
To see why this view fails, let’s review a variety of ways it might take shape. Ac-
count 1: when we grasp a rule we acquire a mediating mental state the content of
which encodes a descriptive procedure for how we are to act in accord with the rule
(Wittgenstein 1953: §197; Kripke 1982: 10-22). But what exactly is encoded as the
content of what we’ve grasped? One might suggest that the content consists in a de-
scriptive list of procedures. On this view, grasping the plus rule consists in grasping
that ‘1 + 1 = 2’, ‘1 + 2 = 3’, ‘1 + 3 = 4’, and so on. But it’s surely not the case that in
grasping a rule, its entire application somehow appears before the agent’s mind
(Wittgenstein 1953: §139; Kripke 1982: 22), because the entire application is poten-
tially infinite and includes cases the finite agent has never yet considered. So as it
stands, this view is implausible.
Maybe, then, one could adjust Account 1 to Account 2: when we grasp a rule we ac-
quire a mental state the content of which encodes (a) an abbreviated list of procedures
– e.g. ‘1 + 1 = 2’, ‘1 + 2 = 3’ – and (b) the additional procedure, expressed by and so
on, indicating that one is to use the examples displayed in (a) as samples to continue
on in the same way (Kripke 1982: 10-16). Yet to tell someone to ‘continue the same
way’ is just to tell them to ‘continue following the rule’, so ‘and so on’ is not helpful
because the very question is what counts as continuing the same way. In other words,
if I don’t already know how to follow the rule for plus then I won’t know how to con-
tinue from ‘1 + 2 = 3’ in the same way in accord with the plus rule, and so to tell me to
continue on with the plus rule in the same way with the phrase ‘and so on’ is of no
help to me. Yet the non-cognitivist might try to adjust (b) of Account 2 into a new Ac-
count 3 in order to avoid the circular explanation that an agent can only grasp a rule if
she has already understood it in the first place. Account 3: the ‘and so on’ in Account
2 does not simply mean ‘continue on in the same way’, but rather contains a further
rule providing procedures for continuing on from the first rule (Kripke 1982: 17). For
example, this further rule might contain the procedure: ‘and so on’ is to be continued
as ‘1 + 3 = 4’, ‘1 + 4 = 5’, and so on. But this move is also unhelpful, because it re-
turns us right back to the problems of Accounts 1 and 2: either (1) the entire applica-
tion of this further rule is to appear before the agent’s mind, or (2) this further rule
contains an abbreviated portion of its application along with the procedure, expressed
by and so on, that one is to use these abbreviated portions as samples to continue on in
the same way. And we have already seen why these options are inadequate.
Since accounts 1-3 failed, one might change their approach to Account 4: when we
grasp a rule we acquire a mental state that causally disposes us to act in accord with a
rule (Kripke 1982: 22-37). On this view, the connection between grasping a rule and
subsequently applying it is a causal one, so there’s no worry of interpreting what is en-
coded in the rule we grasp. Since our grasp of a rule causes us to act in accord with it,
the rule that ‘someone means is to be read off from his dispositions’ (Kripke 1982:
29). But this account cannot work because if we claim that our grasp of a rule causes
us to act in accord with it, then there’s no possibility of our grasping a rule and failing
to act in accord with it. Here we are either causally disposed to act in way A and so act
in accord with A, or we are causally disposed to act in way B and so act in accord with
B. But in either case, since the rule that ‘someone means is to be read off from his dis-
positions’, there is no failing to act in accord with a rule, e.g. failing to act in accord
with A. There is just acting in accord with some other ‘rule’, e.g. acting in accord with
S. Afr. J. Philos. 2010, 29(3) 295
296 S. Afr. J. Philos. 2010, 29(3)
B. So dispositional Account 4, as merely descriptive of acts, fails to account for the
normativity of rules, i.e. that one’s responses can be wrong. Moreover, since Account
4 fails to provide normative criteria for correct applications of a rule that are independ-
ent of an agent’s causally disposed responses, it betrays the very reason
non-cognitivists appealed to such an objective account of rule-following in the first
place; i.e. to maintain objectivity by avoiding rules that are dependent upon agent’s re-
sponses.
I’ve now shown that four non-cognitivist accounts of rule-following fail. In Account
4, the connection between grasping a rule and subsequently applying it was too strict.
Having rules causally determine our actions does not allow for an account of their
normativity. In Account 3 the connection between grasping a rule and subsequently
applying it was too loose. Encoding rules with further rules made fixing on an action
impossible. And Accounts 1-2 required that we understand a rule before we can grasp
it, which puts the cart before the horse. The failure of these accounts shows us that the
connection between grasping a rule and subsequently applying it is not plausibly es-
tablished via the mediation of that rule somehow appearing before our minds. Further-
more, even if a rule did appear before one’s mind, we can easily imagine that what ap-
pears before the mind of an agent that correctly applies a rule can also appear before
the mind of an agent that does not correctly apply it (Wittgenstein 1953: §152). So
what comes before one’s mind is not what grounds one’s grasp of a rule, even if what
comes before one’s mind is often associated with it. Thus, the non-cognitivist has not
adequately supported their claim (2) that humans possess psychological machinery
with which to grasp independently fixed rules and to act in accord with them. And this
in turn renders suspect their claim (1) that there are such independently fixed rules, the
following of which is to be explained by a psychic grasp of them. The non-cogni-
tivist’s two-component view of rule-following, by divorcing rules from the ‘responses
and reactions a propensity to which one acquires when one learns the practice’ involv-
ing the rule itself, suggests a fanciful picture of what a rule is and what it takes to act
in accord with it. Upon closer inspection we find that ‘there is no such thing here as,
so to say, a wheel that he is to catch hold of, the right machine which, once chosen,
will carry him on automatically’ (Wittgenstein 1970: §304). So we see that the
non-cognitivist’s view of rule-following not only fails to explain how we can grasp
and act in accord with rules, but also fails to suggest a realistic picture of how this is to
be achieved. For if we consider how students actually learn rules in concrete cases, we
see that all that’s involved is a certain (usually extensive) training (Wittgenstein 1953:
§198); training into and active involvement in a communal practice where students
learn to develop a knack, technical skill, or ingrained sensibility to act and react as
others do within their practice. We do not in real cases expect a student to acquire
mastery of a rule ‘in a flash’ via a psychic grasp of all the possible instances of a rule.
Rather, we expect the student to progressively become better at mastering the rule as
their skill develops and as their active involvement, in the practice where that rule
functions, matures and is fine-tuned. As McDowell rightly points out:
the structure of the space of reasons is not constituted in splendid isolation from
anything merely human. The demands of reason are essentially such that a hu-
man upbringing can open a human being’s eyes to them (1996: 92).
6. Our Rules, Culture, and Nature
The ‘objective’ conception of rules appealed to non-cognitivists because they thought
it only makes sense to say that one correctly acts in accord with a rule if there are inde-
pendently fixed rules that one is capable of psychically grasping. Accordingly, they
thought that it only makes sense to say that one correctly applies a concept, moral or
otherwise, if there are independently fixed rules for the application of that concept that
one is capable of psychically grasping. In other words, the non-cognitivist assumes the
objective conception of rule-following in an attempt to account for the normativity of
concept application; to explain how it is that an application of a concept, moral or oth-
erwise, can go wrong. The problem with ‘non-objective’ accounts of rules, as Gibbard
expressed earlier, is that they seem unable to account for the fixedness, and so
normativity, of rules. That is, one might worry that by rejecting the objective concep-
tion of rules, the Wittgensteinian analysis has led us to what Michael Dummett has
called ‘full-blooded conventionalism’, the view that a given statement’s necessity and
truth ‘consists always in our having expressly decided to treat that very statement as
unassailable’ (1959: 329, 337, 348; McDowell 1981: 150-152). The worry is that be-
cause there are no independently fixed rules for us to grasp, our treating any statement
as true or false must ultimately result from a decision of how to treat that statement.
But if the truth-value of a statement is a result of our decisions, then the truth-value of
any statement is as flexible as our decisions are, and in that case we can no longer ac-
count for how our decisions about the truth-value of statements can be wrong. The
general worry is that non-objective conceptions of rules must also be non-normative
ones.
One of Wittgenstein’s philosophical contributions was in showing that this worry is
misplaced. By bringing rules out of individual minds and into the public space of cul-
ture, he avoids the worrisome claim that it’s the decisions of individuals that deter-
mines the truth-value of statements. Indeed, the very point of dismantling Accounts
1-4 in §5 was to show that our rule-following ability is not suitably grounded in the
mind (and hence the decisions) of individuals at all (Wittgenstein 1974: II, §33, 70).
As Wittgenstein argues in Philosophical Investigations:
‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a
rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one
was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it (§202).
Gibbard and others that worry that non-objective conceptions of rules must also be
non-normative ones have missed this point. Rules are not ‘in the mind’ at all, but are
rather diachronically stable patterns of activity that have been shaped by the shared
sensitivities and responsive actions of the agent’s involved in the communal practice
in which that rule has the particular function that it does (see Wittgenstein 1953:
§198-199). Like a well-trodden path through the wilderness a rule receives its signifi-
cance in part by the history of its use, the constitution of its users, and the purpose for
which they used it, while further hinting at the direction for how it should continue.
A rule is a constituent path within a community-wide practice, and because of its
public nature, what constitutes following in accord with a rule is not some individual’s
decision. Insofar as rules are not already ‘out there’ independently fixed from human
response, our ‘going on in the same way’ in accord with a rule is in fact contingent in-
sofar as it depends upon facts regarding our natural and socio-cultural constitution and
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tendencies. But it would be confused to think that this entails that our ‘going on in the
same way’ in accord with a rule is decidedly arbitrary. I suggest that it’s just a contin-
gent fact that we are born into a world equipped with needs (e.g. to eat and mate, etc.),
purposes to achieve (e.g. to acquire food and mates, etc.), and instinctive sensitivities
(e.g. to see things as edible or mate-able, etc.) and for, presumably evolutionary, rea-
sons, nature has it that those of us who are alive today share in our basic needs, pur-
poses, and sentient architecture such that we can work to attain these together.5 It’s
this common rootedness in nature, need, and purpose that brings our sensitivities and
responsive actions together to form the practices that we have, and we don’t decide to
accept the procedures of our practices anymore than we decide to accept these prac-
tices themselves:
We do not decide to accept them or reject them at all, any more than we decide
to be human beings as opposed to trees. To ask whether our human practices or
forms of life themselves are “correct” or “justified” is to ask whether we are
“correct” or “justified” in being the sorts of things we are (Stroud 1965: 518).
Furthermore, insofar as we are to achieve the ends of our practices, the steps we take
are not arbitrary. As Wittgenstein puts it, ‘the rules aren’t arbitrary if the purpose of
the game is to be achieved’ (1974: §140; Stroud 1965: 515). And since we share in our
ways of living it’s also evident that we share in the rules for living those ways. So to
ask if an agent is following in accord with a rule, then, only makes sense when that
agent is considered within the wider context of her community of fellow practitioners.
And it’s with respect to these wider communal practices that an individual’s actions
are to be considered as correct or incorrect. That’s why it’s not sensible to ask how an
agent, divorced from the context of practice, can follow in accord with a rule that de-
rives its sense from within that practice. A ‘person goes by [an expression of a rule,
such as] a signpost only insofar as there is an established usage, a custom’
(Wittgenstein 1953: §198).
7. Implications of McDowell’s Wittgensteinian Argument against
Non-Cognitivism
Given that McDowell’s article Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following relies extensively
on Wittgenstein’s work on rule-following, it’s unfortunate that commentators of
McDowell have not provided an adequate picture of Wittgenstein’s work as a back-
ground to McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism. This is what I have pro-
vided in §5-6. Let’s now review how McDowell’s Wittgensteinian rule-following
analysis dismantles non-cognitivism.
First, the non-cognitivist thought that in order to apply a concept correctly, there
must be some objective rule that is independent of human sensitivities and responses
that determines that concept’s correct application. Further, the non-cognitivist claims
that we can only act in accord with the rule for that concept’s correct application by
5 For example, it might be the case that our ability to enter into complex practices with one another is
grounded upon and made possible by ‘The psychic unity of humankind – that is, a universal and uni-
form human nature – [which] is necessarily imposed to the extent and along those dimensions that our
psychologies are collections of complex adaptations [… it may be that] selection, interacting with sex-
ual recombination, tends to impose at the genetic level near uniformity in the functional design of our
complex neurocomputational machinery’ (Tooby & Cosmides 2005: 39) and, presumably, it’s such a
uniformity in aspects of our nature that makes social coordination in judgments and actions possible.
Note that this point is not attributed to Wittgenstein.
cognitively grasping it. In §5-6 we considered four different accounts of how this
‘grasping’ might be achieved, but we found them all inadequate. So thus far the
non-cognitivist has failed to provide a convincing account of how it is that we can fol-
low in accord with a rule for the correct application of our concepts, moral or other-
wise. Moreover, it was precisely this failed non-cognitivist assumption that rules for
the correct application of concepts are fixed ‘independently of the responses and reac-
tions a propensity to which one acquires when one learns the practice itself’
(McDowell 1981: 146) that motivated the non-cognitivist to suppose that ‘any respect-
able evaluative concept must correspond to a classification intelligible from outside
the evaluative outlook within which the concept functions’ (McDowell 1981: 153).
That is to say, it’s because the non-cognitivist supposes that the correct use of con-
cepts in general requires that one psychically grasp an independently fixed rule for
their correct application, that the non-cognitivist also supposes that the correct use of
evaluative concepts in particular requires that one psychically grasp an independently
fixed rule for their correct application (as the latter is a subset of the former). And it
was this erroneous assumption that led the non-cognitivist to suppose that the exten-
sion of a thick moral concept could be mastered independently of an involved under-
standing of the practice of moral evaluation itself. However, as the Wittgensteinian
analysis has shown, it’s misguided to construe rules as fixed independently of human
responses. Resultantly, there need be no supposition that the correct use of concepts in
general requires that one grasp an independently fixed rule for their correct applica-
tion, and so there need be no supposition that the correct use of evaluative concepts in
particular requires that one grasp an independently fixed rule for their correct applica-
tion either. So the Wittgensteinian analysis does not suppose that the extension of a
thick moral concept could be mastered independently of an involved understanding of
the practice of moral evaluation. Indeed, it’s suggestive of the idea that it only makes
sense to say of an agent that she can correctly apply a moral concept when that agent
is considered within the wider context of her community of fellow moral evaluators.
So it’s clear that the Wittgensteinian analysis that McDowell offers not only avoids the
problems that the non-cognitivist faced with respect to mastery of thick concepts in §4
and with respect to rule-following in §5, but also explains how these problems in §4
and §5 are to be corrected.
Since thick concepts are not independent of evaluation, it also follows that thick
concepts don’t have purely descriptive shape. Resultantly, mastery over thick concepts
is also guided by an evaluative sensitivity. But notice that this casts doubt on the
non-cognitivist’s view that (a) cognitive-states with descriptive content are distinct
from (b) non-cognitive affective or evaluative states, and that (b) are simply post-cog-
nitive responses that are incapable of disclosing features of the world (Williams 1985:
141). Indeed, since mastery over thick concepts requires utilizing evaluative and de-
scriptive sensitivity in order to pick out those features that aptly belong under that
thick concept’s extension (see §4), we have reason to be suspicious of the
non-cognitivist’s strict separation of (a) from (b) since it claimed that only (a) is capa-
ble of determining a concept’s extension. In §4 we saw why this non-cognitivist claim
was incorrect. So McDowell’s argument not only attacks the non-cognitivist account
of thick concepts in particular, but their presupposed bifurcated conception of mind
more generally (McDowell 1981: 143, 154-156).
Notice also that the absolute conception was originally appealing because it was
thought to be explanatorily powerful (Williams 1978: 245-246; McDowell 1981: 142;
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Lang 2001: 194). The absolute conception was supposed to explain how the world as
it appears to each of us relates to each other and to the world as it is independently of
us (Williams 1978: 245-246). However, as we saw in §5, the absolute conception of
rules as fixed objectively and ‘independently of the responses and reactions a propen-
sity to which one acquires when one learns the practice itself’ (McDowell 1981: 146)
was not only unable to account for the vast range of thick concepts we actually use in
articulating features of people’s actions and the world as conceived by us (see §2) but
also rendered suspect how one ‘grasps’ and applies the concepts of any features of the
world at all. By imposing the restriction that what is ‘objective’ is fundamentally sepa-
rated from our responses, the absolute conception made it impossible for the world to
be something graspable by us at all. The purity it sought was otherworldly, and so it
seems reasonable that we ‘should accept sometimes that there may be nothing better to
do than explicitly appeal to a hoped-for community of human response’ (McDowell
1981: 153). The demand for more, that there must be a sense of objectivity or genuine-
ness beyond that of universal agreement in human responses, actions, and judgments,
is presumably rooted in nothing more than the metaphysical assumption that some-
thing like the absolute conception must be right. But that’s an assumption we’ve seen
is problematic. Importantly, the point here is not that there’s something fundamentally
wrong with naturalistic accounts of the world. Rather, the analysis here simply shows
that the absolute conception has not lived up to its expectations of explanatory power
and that a naturalistic account of the world construed in terms of the absolute concep-
tion will invariably remain an inadequate one.
8. Challenge One: Gerald Lang’s Criticism
McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism has seen numerous challenges. The
first that I’ll discuss is one offered by Lang. According to Lang:
McDowell’s… argument takes the form of a modus tollens… [but his argument
is] flawed, because the conditional statement ‘If the outsider could perform the
disentangling manoeuvre, then he could predict the extension of the concept’, is
false. The ability to perform the disentangling manoeuvre does not entail mas-
tery of the extension of the concept… [and so] differences between insiders [of
the community of moral evaluators] and outsiders do not support McDowell’s
arguments against, specifically, the disentangling manoeuvre (2001: 203).
Now, this passage suggests that Lang has unfortunately misunderstood McDowell’s
argument. Because, contra Lang, McDowell doesn’t claim that the ability to perform
the disentangling manoeuvre – the ability to distinctly separate description from evalu-
ation – entails mastery of the extension of a thick concept. That’s not McDowell’s
point at all. Rather, McDowell is claiming that if the disentangling manoeuvre is possi-
ble, then ‘outsiders’ should be able in principle to master the extension of a thick con-
cept without needing to hold or understand the perspective from inside the community
of evaluators and evaluative practice. As I’ve explained in the preceding sections, it’s
clear that McDowell’s argument is that thick concepts have both descriptive and
evaluative shape, and that as a result an ‘outsider’ tracking purely descriptive features
independently of an evaluative outlook (of those inside the community of evaluative
practitioners) cannot master the extension of a thick concept. The outsider lacks a
sense for ‘aptness’; e.g. a sense for what counts as an action appropriately belonging
to the extension of a thick moral concept in certain circumstances. So Lang is mis-
guided in claiming that McDowell’s argument against the disentangling manoeuvre is
not supported by the differences between (a) ‘outsiders’ that track purely descriptive
features independently of an evaluative outlook, and (b) ‘insiders’ whose evaluative
outlook enables them to pick out those features that aptly belong under the extension
of a thick concept. As I’ve argued at great length by now, it’s precisely this difference
of being outside the evaluative practice, and so being restricted to tracking purely de-
scriptive features independently of evaluation, that prevents ‘outsiders’ from determin-
ing which features are apt for a thick concept and so prevents them from developing a
mastery over a thick concept’s extension.
9. Challenge Two: The Sufficiency of Imaginative Identification
Another challenge to McDowell that appears often is what I’ll call ‘the sufficiency of
imaginative identification’ challenge. J. E. J. Altham (1986) posed this type of chal-
lenge as follows:
it does not seem that, in order to grasp the extension of the [thick] term, one
must actually share the evaluative perspective of those who use it. It would be
enough to have a merely imaginative identification with their perspective…
[moreover] if a merely imaginative identification suffices, then the thought
arises that once it has been achieved, and the term grasped, a neutral equivalent
can be introduced (278-279).
Olle Blomberg (2007) also writes:
it is not clear what the difference is between (a) accepting the evaluation em-
bedded in a thick concept (“sharing values”), and (b) grasping the thick con-
cept’s “evaluative point” imaginatively without accepting it, where (b) cannot
amount to acquiring a purely descriptive equivalent of the concept. Hare’s attri-
bution [that one must accept the evaluation embedded in the community where
the thick concept functions in order to master that concept’s extension] is not
entirely unwarranted until Entanglers [McDowellians] provide a clear account
of this difference (72-73).
First, we shouldn’t get carried away with the idea of ‘imaginative’ identification; it’s
still to be identification nonetheless. And we already saw in §4 that e.g. only certain
acts of strength and determination in the face of conflict are aptly ‘courageous’, and
that how these ‘certain’ acts are to be picked out involves more than simply tracking
some pre-evaluative set of descriptive features. If Jones is to master the extension of
the thick concept ‘courageous’ through an ‘imaginative identification’ with the per-
spective from which those actions are appropriately collected together, then the imag-
inings of Jones must be appropriately constrained such that they are in line with the
perspective that other moral evaluators hold non-imaginatively. That is, the imagina-
tive case is parasitic on the genuine case and so not just any imaginings will enable
Jones to collect just those actions that are apt for the extension of ‘courageous’. Only
certain imaginative identifications will be appropriate, and as we saw in §4-5, deter-
mining what counts as appropriate here is dependent upon an evaluative outlook. Fur-
thermore, mastery over a thick concept consists in ‘be[ing] able to predict applications
and withholdings of it in new cases’ (McDowell 1981: 144) which requires that one is
capable of utilizing this evaluative outlook in new cases in order to pick out e.g. just
those actions that are aptly ‘courageous’ in some new case (one will hardly ever be in-
terested in only identifying ‘courage’ in old cases). So, on the one hand, it was by vir-
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tue of utilizing an evaluative outlook that one identified old cases of ‘courageous’ acts,
and on the other hand, it’s by virtue of utilizing an evaluative outlook that one can
pick out just those acts that are aptly ‘courageous’ in new cases too. So insofar as iden-
tification of evaluative features in both old and new cases requires an evaluative out-
look, re-identification of evaluative features as the same evaluative features requires
an evaluative outlook too. So even if I wanted to construct a ‘neutral equivalent’ of an
evaluative term and apply it in new cases, it’s still required that I utilize an evaluative
outlook in order to identify those features in the object to which I intend to apply the
neutral term as possessing features that are aptly similar to those of the evaluative term
which I am trying to replace. Without utilizing an evaluative outlook I may not be us-
ing the ‘neutral term’ as an apt equivalent of the evaluative term at all. Thus, it’s un-
clear what this ‘imaginative identification’, which Altham (1986) suggests, actually
consist in, and how one in this ‘imaginative’ state is to determine what actions count
as appropriate ones for the extension of a thick concept without already depending
upon an evaluative outlook to do this.
However, there is something right in raising the challenge of imaginative identifica-
tion. Its importance is that it brings out a question about what constitutes the differ-
ence ‘between (a) accepting the evaluation embedded in a thick concept… and (b)
grasping the thick concept’s “evaluative point” imaginatively without accepting it’
(Blomberg 2007: 72-73). The difference between (a) and (b) will be best explicated by
an example. Imagine Jones, a young boy that, throughout some period during his up-
bringing, was taught to evaluate e.g. a person’s actions of strength and determination
in the face of conflict. Maybe he grew up in a tribe where such actions are helpful to
one’s community at large, or maybe he was born into city life where such actions help
one procure jobs and income. Regardless, Jones’s training consists in being educated
into a social world that makes sense of evaluating people on the basis of their actions
in the face of conflict. It’s likely that Jones was taught that such actions are worthy of
praise and emulation, but it’s possible that he was taught otherwise. Either way,
Jones’s moral education is still such that he has acquired a sensitivity and sensibility to
see that a person’s actions are such that some evaluation or other is called for. One
could say: regardless of the evaluative direction Jones’s attitude is pointing (e.g. pro or
con), it’s first required that Jones has become sensitive to an evaluative point (e.g. that
a person’s actions are such that some evaluation or other is called for). And as long as
Jones acquires sensitivity to the evaluative practice such that he can identify certain
relevant features of an action as salient (e.g. strength and determination in the face of
conflict), and so understand that some evaluative attitude or other is called for by that
action, Jones is capable of conceiving that one might evaluate these same features with
an attitude opposite of his. This is an option that, although not likely to convince
Jones, is at least intelligible to him. And so this is how (b) grasping the thick concept’s
evaluative point imaginatively without accepting it, is to be distinguished from (a) ac-
cepting the evaluation embedded in a thick concept. In other words, the difference is
that in (b) one must simply acquire sensitivity to an evaluative practice such that one
can identify certain relevant features of an action as salient (e.g. strength and determi-
nation in the face of conflict) and so understand that an evaluative attitude is called for
by that action, while in (a) one has further fixed on which direction their evaluation
points. And if one cannot make sense of some situation having an evaluative point at
all, then that is all the same as saying that one cannot grasp the thick concept’s
evaluative point imaginatively.
Although Jones is capable of conceiving of the possibility that one might evaluate
these same features with an attitude opposite of his, Jones, having himself learned the
evaluative point for particular practical purposes, will of course find one evaluative di-
rection most natural since this is the evaluative direction in line with the purpose for
which the evaluative point was taught. For example, Jones might have been taught to
evaluate a person’s act of strength and determination in the face of conflict positively,
because such acts are those that best enable one to survive in the kind of environment
one happens to be living in. Given Jones’s bio-cultural environment, and thus the sort
of evaluative training he received in order to productively engage in those environ-
ments, Jones will naturally find one evaluative direction as his default. A ‘neutral’
evaluative direction (of which it’s hard, but maybe not impossible to find genuine
cases) would be an exception case because to find no evaluative direction as natural to
hold would suggest that there was no strong initial motivation for which the evaluative
point was learned, and in that case, the relevant thick concept would have been with-
out much purpose anyway. However, I doubt that there are genuine cases of ‘neutral’
evaluation that are still genuinely evaluative; they are more likely to be cases of
multi-directional evaluation of which the weighing of directions makes a single direc-
tion less compelling.
Finally, it’s important to mention (since I’ll make use of this point later) that what
I’ve said so far in no way precludes the possibility that one can change the direction of
their evaluative attitude, or even that there must be one attitude connected to a particu-
lar thick concept. It’s unlikely that an attitude connected to a thick concept will be
only loosely connected, varying unpredictably, if the purpose for which one learned
the evaluative point is sufficiently strong or widespread in their community. However,
there will be cases when one, after having learnt an evaluative point, can change their
evaluative direction. For instance, our young boy Jones might have been taught an
evaluative point for a purpose that is marginal to the community in which he lives. Or
maybe he has just learnt the evaluative point and has not encountered many real-life
instances in which he has exercised his evaluative direction. But it’s possible that
Jones will hereafter change his evaluative direction given that he’s sufficiently edu-
cated to do so.6 That is, since Jones had originally learned the evaluative point (that a
person’s actions are such that some evaluation or other is called for) for particular
practical purposes, he found one evaluative direction most natural since that was the
evaluative direction in line with the purpose for which the evaluative point was taught.
But this is compatible with the possibility that Jones may learn the same evaluative
point for a different purpose, and so in turn come to find another evaluative direction
most natural since this is now the evaluative direction in line with the new purpose for
which the evaluative point was taught. If the purpose of the latter e.g. is more central
to the community in which Jones is involved or taught to Jones to a greater extent,
there’s nothing in what I’ve said that suggests that a change in Jones’s evaluative di-
rection would be impossible. And given the complexity of our lives in general and our
social ties in particular, and the different directions in which they pull at us, there may
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6 This is an important point to make, and I think it’s especially helpful when applied to, for instance, ra-
cial discrimination. That is to say, this point makes it clear that, even if e.g. one was raised as a child to
evaluatively pick out certain racial features of others for certain practical purposes, we’re still capable of
changing or neutralizing our evaluative direction with respect to racial features. See my papers Racial
Epithets: What We Say and Mean by Them (2008) and Slurs: A Philosophical Analysis (m.s.) for an
analysis of how we might come to characterize and evaluate people on the basis of racial features.
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be several different crosscutting purposes for which we learn an evaluative point. So
although evaluative concepts require an evaluative outlook for their mastery, this in no
way entails that an evaluative concept is restricted to one evaluative direction (see
Blackburn 1992: 294-299; see also Dancy 1996: 266-272). In short, the problem with
the sufficiency of imaginative identification challenge that critics of McDowell have
posed, is that it assumes that in order to master the extension of a thick concept one
must, not only grasp its evaluative point, but also hold a particular evaluative direc-
tion. But as I’ve explained in this section, this needn’t be the case at all.
10. Challenge Three: Alan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn’s
Non-Cognitivist Accounts
Let’s now turn to more recent developments of non-cognitivism, starting with Gib-
bard’s norm-expressivism, to see if they fare better than the other classical accounts
we’ve considered. According to Gibbard:
when the licensed user of the [thick] term calls an act [e.g.] lewd, he means that
L-censoriousness [i.e. ‘the feeling of outraged shock and censure that goes with
finding something lewd’] toward its agent is warranted for passing beyond
these limits. The content of these limits is not built into the meaning… Rather,
he presupposes that there are such limits… [these limits refer to] standards of
warrant for feelings of L-censoriousness toward lewd acts (1992: 280-281).
According to Gibbard, moral statements express non-cognitive attitudes, such as ac-
ceptance, towards a system of norms warranting feelings in response to certain actions.
But notice that Gibbard’s account diverges from classical accounts of non-cognitivism
in that he does not claim (like Hare had) that description and evaluation are both lexi-
cal components in the meaning of the thick concept. For Gibbard, e.g., the non-cogni-
tive attitude of accepting a system of norms warranting feelings of shock ‘is not built
into the meaning’ of the thick concept ‘lewd’. One just expresses their acceptance of a
system of norms warranting feelings of shock towards the object that they are calling
‘lewd’. Gibbard’s also differs from classical accounts in that he doesn’t claim that de-
scription alone guides the application of thick concepts; sometimes our feelings do: ‘In
applying a [thick] term like ‘lewd’… people are guided alike by the descriptive fea-
tures of the case and by their feelings about… [what] various descriptive kinds of acts
warrant’ (Gibbard 1992: 282, 271-272). Although Gibbard concedes that description
and evaluation may not be independent (1992: 272), he clearly thinks that description
and evaluation can still be disentangled (1992: 268). This is evident given that Gib-
bard considers evaluative feelings as warranted responses to descriptive kinds; when
we are not guided directly by description, we are guided by those feelings that ‘de-
scriptive kinds of acts warrant’ (Gibbard 1992: 282, my emphasis). Gibbard’s non-
cognitivism may differ from classical versions in interesting ways, but he’s done noth-
ing to distance himself from accepting the disentangling manoeuvre and so he fares no
better against McDowell’s arguments than classical non-cognitivists. Finally, Gibbard
claims that ‘Norm acceptance, I speculated, is the work of a special psychic mecha-
nism that ties discussion to action’ (1992: 278). That is, Gibbard claims that the nor-
mative rules that one accepts, and that one e.g. expresses acceptance of in moral state-
ments, is grasped by some mediating psychic mechanism in the mind. But I’ve already
argued at great length in §5 that this idea is implausible.
Let’s now turn to Simon Blackburn’s non-cognitivist account. Like Gibbard,
Blackburn doesn’t claim that description and evaluation are both lexical components
in the meaning of the thick concept. Indeed, Blackburn is suspicious that there even
are thick concepts (1992: 285). According to Blackburn:
If a person’s industry is entirely misdirected… we do not deny that it is [still]
industry… people can be too prudent and too discerning. But that does not stop
them from being industrious, prudent and discerning (1992: 286).
The idea is that although one can be industrious, which is thought to involve a pro-atti-
tude, one can be too industrious, which is thought to involve a con-attitude. Blackburn
regards this as showing that it ‘is actually extremely difficult to say which attitude [e.g.
pro or con], if any, is fixed as part of the literal meaning of most of these terms…[and
so] I suggest that there is no stable connection between any single attitude and such a
term’ (1992: 294). And because there’s no stable connection between a single attitude
and a thick term, e.g. between the thick concept ‘greedy’ and the con-attitude of moral
disapprobation, Blackburn argues that ‘the point remains that an individual element of
the mix – moral disapprobation, for example – can be removed without semantic rup-
ture’ (1992: 297). That is, Blackburn claims that the con-attitude of moral disapproba-
tion can be removed from the thick concept ‘greedy’ without changing that concept’s
meaning, and as a result, one could master the extension of that thick concept inde-
pendently of an involved understanding of the practice of moral evaluation. In another
example, Blackburn claims that ‘discussion, for instance of whether Pavarotti is fat"’
[where ‘fat’ is the description and ‘"’ is the tone expressing a con-attitude] is nothing
new from discussion of whether to feel repelled or not at his weight’ (1992: 297). It’s
clear from these examples that Blackburn thinks that the extension of a thick concept
is determined by descriptive features alone (e.g. weight), and that an evaluative atti-
tude (e.g. as carried by the tone) can be disentangled from the description, and even
removed, without alteration to that concept’s shape. So on Blackburn’s view, applying
a thick concept to Pavarotti is similar to applying a descriptive concept to Pavarotti but
with a tone in your voice that, considering the context of your speech act, licenses the
hearer to suppose that you are expressing an attitude towards Pavarotti on the basis of
the applied description (Blackburn 1992: 289, 297). And in general, to utter an eva-
luative statement is similar to uttering a descriptive statement with a tone in your voice
that, considering the context of your speech act, licenses the hearer to suppose that you
are expressing an attitude on the basis of the description. Blackburn thinks this analy-
sis of his has undermined the McDowellian picture of thick terms.
There are several points to make here. First, Blackburn hasn’t really offered an inde-
pendent argument against McDowell on behalf of the legitimacy of the disentangling
manoeuvre. Blackburn simply presupposes its legitimacy in the examples he uses to
support non-cognitivism. In the Pavarotti example above, for instance, he simply as-
sumes that the extension of the thick concept ‘fat’ is determined by descriptive fea-
tures alone (e.g. weight), and that an evaluative attitude (e.g. as carried by the tone)
can be disentangled from the description, and even removed, without alteration to that
concept’s shape. But as I argued in §4, an evaluative outlook is required in order to de-
termine the extension of a thick concept, so even the thick concept ‘fat’ cannot be de-
termined by descriptive features alone. For instance, during Arnold Schwarzenegger’s
bodybuilding career he had a competition weight of 240-250 pounds, but as evidenced
by the fact that he won Mr. Olympia seven times, it’s clearly not appropriate to apply
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the thick concept ‘fat’ to him on the basis of his weight alone. And surely there are vo-
luptuous women, such as the supermodel Tyra Banks, to which the thick concept ‘fat’
would be an inapt application in spite of the fact that they are heavier than less volup-
tuous women that couldn’t make it as supermodels. So the legitimacy of the disentan-
gling manoeuvre is not something that one can simply assume.7
Blackburn attempted to motivate his non-cognitivism by pointing out that although
one can be ‘industrious’, one can be too ‘industrious’. This was supposed to show that
there is no attitude, e.g. pro or con, that has a stable connection to the thick concept
‘industrious’. Presumably then, the evaluative attitude is an inessential component to
the thick concept ‘industrious’. But Blackburn’s move here is suspect. First, notice
that Blackburn’s criticism of McDowell runs parallel to the criticism posed by the
challenge of imaginative identification. Blackburn claims that the McDowellian pic-
ture of thick terms implies that ethical activity are ‘exercises in talking past each other’
on the grounds that ‘if you don’t respond to [a thick term such as] lewdness as I do,
then… your amalgamated concept of lewdness is not mine, and we are left in incom-
municable solitude’ (1992: 299). The reason why Blackburn thinks that McDowell is
committed to the claim that a correct application of a thick concept to an object re-
quires that one accept a particular evaluative direction for that object runs parallel to
the reason why, in §8, Blomberg claimed that ‘Hare’s attribution [that one must accept
the evaluation embedded in the community where the thick concept functions in order
to master that concept’s extension] is not entirely unwarranted’. Given what I showed
in §8 in response to Blomberg and Altham, we can see that the problem with
Blackburn’s criticism rests on his mistakenly conflating an evaluative point with an
evaluative direction. Blackburn assumes that if there is no singularly stable evaluative
attitude connected to a thick concept, then there is no ‘thickness’ to that concept at all
and that we should therefore be able to master that concept without an evaluative out-
look. But it doesn’t follow that because it’s not required that a thick concept have a
singularly stable evaluative direction, that a thick concept can therefore be mastered
independently of a sensitivity to its evaluative point. Indeed, in §8 I explained how, al-
though one will find a particular evaluative direction natural to a thick concept by vir-
tue of that evaluative direction being in line with the purpose for which the evaluative
point was taught, there needn’t be a singularly stable evaluative direction for a thick
concept at all.
In §8 I pointed out that moral education has a socio-cultural function, and when one
acquires mastery over a thick moral concept one acquires a sensitivity to an evaluative
point for a particular purpose or purposes. However, evaluative directions can change
and one can be pulled in different directions, because the purpose or purposes for
which one learns an evaluative point needn’t be singular. In fact, they are presumably
as complicated as our social networks and lives are. Of course for each thick concept
there will be an evaluative direction that one finds most natural (i.e. the thick concept’s
‘default direction’). And this is clearly the case since even Blackburn relied upon a
thick concept’s natural evaluative direction in order to suggest that thick concepts
have no evaluative direction. That is, Blackburn initially attempted to motivate his
non-cognitivism by pointing out that although one can be ‘industrious’, one can be too
7 Indeed, it seems that one would be in violation of an appropriateness condition on the term ‘fat’ by ap-
plying it to paradigm bodybuilders and supermodels, and if a speaker continued to misapply such a con-
cept in this way, that speaker could provide warrant for their linguistic community to identify them as
incompetent or unworthy of engaging in sensible communication.
‘industrious’. What’s important to notice is that Blackburn clearly could not arouse
our intuition that ‘industrious’ is to be negatively evaluated without augmenting ‘in-
dustrious’ with ‘too’, which is defined evaluatively as ‘an excessive extent or degree;
beyond what is desirable, fitting, or right’ (Collins English Dictionary 2003). That is,
our default understanding of ‘Jones is industrious’ or ‘Jones is courageous’ is with a
positive evaluative direction, and augmenting such statements with ‘too’ alters our un-
derstanding on semantic grounds because saying of X that it is too X is to say that X is
‘excessive [in] extent or degree; beyond what is desirable, fitting, or right’. It is to ex-
press semantically that something that we may have had a pro-attitude towards is ex-
cessive to the extent that it is no longer apt for a pro-attitude. So if attitudes are really
as fluid and inessential to thick concepts as Blackburn suggests, then it’s at least suspi-
cious why Blackburn found it necessary to augment the thick concept ‘industrious’
with ‘too’ to make his point. Strangely, Blackburn relies on the natural evaluative di-
rections of thick concepts in attempting to prove that such concepts have no natural
evaluative directions at all. I find this move on Blackburn’s part suspect. Resultantly,
it’s clear that Blackburn has not only failed to convincingly criticize the evaluative na-
ture of thick concepts (of which he thinks there are none), but has also failed (along
with other non-cognitivists) to defend the legitimacy of his use of the disentangling
manoeuvre against McDowell’s arguments.
11. Thick Moral Concepts and the Moral of Thick Concepts:
Concluding Remarks
More than fifty years after Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic, non-cognitivists are
still motivated by a naturalism that takes for granted the external viewpoint of the ab-
solute conception (Blomberg 2007: 64). In line with this external viewpoint, the
non-cognitivist thought that in order to apply a concept correctly, one must psychically
grasp a rule for its correct application that is fixed independently of human responses.
We saw how McDowell used Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to show
that this view is fancifully false, and that this view imposes on us the demand that we
transcend the bounds of our cognitive powers (McDowell 1981: 153). However, as de-
manding as the non-cognitivist position is, it has itself been unable to account for even
the simplest cases of moral reasoning (see especially Schueler 1988; van Roojen 1996;
Unwin 1999; Schroeder 2008). Take an example of moral reasoning from Geach
(1965: 463):
If doing a thing is bad, getting you little brother to do it is bad.
Tormenting the cat is bad.
Ergo, getting your little brother to torment the cat is bad.
The problem here, which is known as the Frege-Geach problem, is that:
The whole nerve of the reasoning is that “bad” should mean exactly the same at
all four occurrences – should not, for example, shift from an evaluative to a de-
scriptive… use. But in the major premise the speaker… is certainly not uttering
acts of condemnation (Geach 1965: 463-464).
That is, we derive the conclusion via modus ponens from the first and second premise
without equivocation. However, while in the second premise ‘bad’ occurs as part of
the assertion ‘tormenting the cat is bad’, and so e.g. is presumably expressive of a
non-cognitive attitude towards the tormenting of cats, the first premise is a conditional
statement where ‘bad’ occurs unasserted as part of the antecedent and consequent of
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the conditional, and so no non-cognitive attitude towards the tormenting of cats is pre-
sumably expressed by that conditional statement. The trouble for the non-cognitivist
here is how to account for the unequivocal meaning of the moral term ‘good’ that oc-
curs in such embedded and un-embedded contexts. The problem for the
non-cognitivist in general is to explain how, in spite of their claim that thick moral
concepts have a different kind of meaning than normal descriptive concepts, both thick
moral concepts and normal descriptive concepts function similarly across linguistic
constructions and are subject to reasoning with the same logical tools. Unlike
non-cognitivists, cognitivists claim that statements involving moral concepts express
truth-evaluable beliefs, so they face no problem accounting for how we can reason
with moral concepts.
I bring up the Frege-Geach problem here to solidify a final point: non-cognitivism
lacks explanatory power across the board. Just from what I’ve pointed out in this pa-
per, we see that non-cognitivism is unable to live up to its claims for how one can rea-
son with thick concepts, how one can master the extension of a thick concept inde-
pendently of evaluation (see §4), how one can grasp and act in accord with rules in
general and for the correct application of thick concepts in particular (see §5), and
how one can have an ‘imaginative identification’ with an evaluative perspective that is
not itself evaluative (see §9). Yet I have accounted for all of these points from the
broadly cognitivist (or, to put it more accurately yet less elegantly, ‘anti-non-cogni-
tivist’) position I share with McDowell (McDowell 1981: 154). If the strongest moti-
vation one has to accept non-cognitivism is a prior appeal to a metaphysical picture of
an absolute conception of the world with mental mechanisms that somehow hook onto
this world, then it’s about time we got rid of this picture (see §7). Indeed, my goal in
this paper was not simply to show why the case of thick concepts should lead us to re-
ject non-cognitivism, but why it should lead us to question these deeper commitments
upon which non-cognitivism is typically based.
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